What is the main question answered by Traditional EDR/CWPP Runtime View?

What did the process, host, or workload do?

What is the main question answered by Runtime ADR?

Which library/function chain inside the application caused the behavior?

What is the difference between EDR and ADR in terms of application-runtime visibility?

EDR does not provide deep language-aware visibility inside the application runtime and typically cannot identify the specific Python/Java/Node/Go/.NET library and function chain that caused the event. ADR provides runtime code visibility and application-runtime visibility at the library, function, syscall, and call-chain level across 10+ languages.

How does ADR reduce false positives compared to EDR?

EDR can be ambiguous because legitimate application-runtime behavior may look suspicious at the process level. ADR reduces ambiguity by showing exactly which library caused the event and whether it is expected or exploit-driven.

What type of CISO needs ADR versus EDR?

Infrastructure CISOs managing mainly IT, infrastructure, endpoints, servers, and packaged apps typically need EDR/CWPP for broad detection. Software Factory CISOs with developers shipping constantly, AI-generated code, open-source-heavy applications, and supply-chain exploits need ADR for code-aware control.

AI speaks code. Your EDR doesn't.

ADR vs EDR

Attackers use AI to turn your code against you. Raven sees what that code does in real time and stops attacks as they happen.

See Raven Stop an Attack

See the difference

THE HOST VIEW

EDR

— Sees processes, network and shell

— Stops at the process boundary

— No code context behind the alert

THE RAVEN WAY

Raven ADR

— Goes inside the running application

— Sees the library, function and execution path

— Answers with the code behind the action

HOW DEEP EACH ONE SEES

NETWORK visible ✓

PROCESSES · SHELL visible ✓

■ VISIBILITY ENDS HERE

APPLICATION RUNTIME ?

LIBRARIES ?

FUNCTIONS · EXECUTION PATH ?

CODE CONTEXT: NONE ✕

NETWORK · PROCESSES visible ✓

APPLICATION RUNTIME inside ✓

14:02:09 handleRequest(/api/v2/orders) · thread-14

14:02:10 deserialize(payload) → LogEvent.readResolve()

LIBRARIES

log4j-core ● jackson ● netty ● spring-web ●

FUNCTIONS · EXECUTION PATH traced ✓

log4j-core › JndiManager.lookup() › attempt: process launch

BLOCKED BEFORE EXECUTION

CODE CONTEXT: FULL ✓

/ 01

Your code has readers. They don't all work for you.

Much of the code running on your servers is open source. Attackers can study the same code your business depends on. AI helps them find and test new ways in.

Same code.
Stronger attackers.

/ 02 — THE GAP

On the server. Still a stranger to the code.

Installing EDR on a server doesn't give it an understanding of the application inside. It can flag suspicious activity without identifying the code that caused it.

That gap costs you twice: an attack can blend into normal activity, and the alert can still leave you hunting for the responsible code.

An agent should earn its footprint.

If it uses your server's resources, it should tell you what your code is doing.

PROCESS PID ACTIVITY

java 4211 ⚠ network egress

node 3877 normal

python3 5104 normal

CODE INSIDE THE PROCESS: UNKNOWN

⚠ ALERT Suspicious activity — java (4211)
Responsible code: —

/ 03 — COMPARE

A process name isn't an explanation.

Raven connects sensitive activity to the library, function and execution path behind it. That context drives detection, prevention and investigation.

java · PID 4211 · opened

log4j-core

jackson

spring-web

openssl

netty

guava

log4j-core › JndiManager.lookup() › attempted process creation

Blocked by runtime policy · responsible code identified

What it sees

Processes, files, memory and network activity

Libraries and functions behind sensitive activity

What triggers detection

Suspicious endpoint and process behavior

Abnormal library behavior and execution paths

What informs blocking

Endpoint behavior and process controls

Library context and policies for sensitive operations

What you investigate

Host and process evidence; code detail varies

Responsible library, function and call path

EDR capabilities vary by vendor, platform and configuration. Blocking uses Raven Runtime Prevention.

/ 04 — PROOF

AI found the opening. Raven blocked the exploit.

CONTROLLED APPLICATION TEST

In a controlled application test, Raven reproduced an AI-discovered Log4j filter bypass and blocked the attempted process creation. No prior knowledge of the exploit. No rule written for it.

Read the Log4j research

→

Application-dependent path; Apache classifies the finding as hardening.

Protect your code At runtime.

See Raven Stop an Attack

Runtime application security. No application code changes required.